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by George Dixon 
The Ohio State University 
A question of continuing importance for the foun .• 
dations of education is whether the traditional loun· 
dational disciplines are adequate to the educational ex· 
periences they help us analyze. Of course, this is not just a 
concern ol educators; researchers in loundational areas 
are also led, at least occasionally, to ask how adequate 
their methods are for the an aly sis of human experience 
generally. But the question seems more persistent and 
bothersome for educators who use the methods o f 
philosophy and the social sciences to understand 
educational experiences. Somehow the greater need 10 
connect theory with educational practice makes the 
question or methodological adequacy more immediate for 
the educational researcher. who can' t as easily push this 
con.earn into the background or wait for another gen· 
eratlon of research before translating theory into practice. 
Certainly II is more convenient to push concern for 
method into the background and get on with the research 
at hand, for such problems are perennially troublesome 
and usually tied into classical philosophical paradoxes 
that defy quick resolution. One such paradox that is 
especially troublesome in education generally and par-
ti
cular
ly puzzling in moral education is the In· 
dividuallcollective relationship mentioned by Professor 
Klohr in his essay " Emerging Foundations for Curriculum 
Theory.'" 
20 
Most people concerned with moral education are 
lamillar with the Individual/collecti ve dilemma In rerms of 
two beliefs that seem to work in opposition to one 
another. On the one hand, we assert that actions which 
can be judged as moral or immoral necessarily Invol ve in· 
dividual choice. As moral agents, we can be neither 
praised nor blamed If we have no degree of choice or con· 
trol over our decisions and actions; one of the defining 
charac teristics or ac tions that we call "moral " Is just this 
fact of ind ividual responsibility. Ethical theories which 
focus on this factor of individual responsibility and duty 
share a Kantian emphasis on the formal aspects of moral 
decisions. 
But there is obviously more to moral decision than in· 
d ivi dual duty and private choice. We must also assert that 
moral decisions are Influenced by circumstances outside 
the individual, circumstances that are connected with the 
time and place of choice, with specific rather than formal 
factors, with the history of the individual as it is situated 
between past experiences and expectations for the future. 
Moralists of the utilitarian persuasion would, in fact, 
calcu late just such factors to the point of explaining how 
an individual is most likely to decide a moral question. 
Their emphasis on the collective or social side of the 
relationship aligns them rather clea rly with the methods 
and emphasis of the social sciences. It is in this apparent 
conflic t between Kantian or formalis ti c ethical theories 
and their uti litarian or naturalistic counterparts that we 
find one source of difficulty for the moral educator con· 
cerned wi th the foundations of his field. 
For example, if the moral educator looks to 
phi losophy to clarify this relat ionship between Individual 
choice and social Influence, he finds that the problem 
gets worse before It gets better. Philoso phers In this cen· 
tury, with a few notable exceptions, have regarded moral 
decisions as matters of private preference and individual 
fee ling. They have preserved the necessarily Individual 
aspect or morality, but only at the cost o f putting most 
moral questions beyond reasonable discussion and public 
evaluation. The resu lt for moral educators has too often 
been one of reducing their task to helping students clarify 
their individual values, and while this Is a worthy vocation, 
it just begins to scratch the surface of the process of 
moral choice and value formation. For such clarification 
must Ignore the social nature o f moral i ty; moral con· 
sensus becomes li ttle more than the tabulation of private 
interests. After individual value preferences have been 
clarified , the teacher must indeed be ready to move on 
quickly to the next topic of discussion; modern sub· 
jectivls t theories o f morality off er little help on the tough 
issues that logically follow Individual clarification. 
The moral educator can tu rn to the social sciences for 
help in understanding how external factors condition 
moral choice, for the social sciences seem to concentrate 
on exactly those social or external factors that the values 
clarification approach tends to ignore. But that strength in 
explaining how and why people choose and act as they do 
comes to the social sciences at Its own high cost. For the 
conclusion that seems implicit In most social science 
research is that external lactors determine Individual 
decisions and actions; the moral responsiblllty that 
educators seek to enhance turns out to be an illusion. 
From a social science perspective, actions can be ex-
plained and even predicted, but In the course of such 
research we seem to remove the action ooing studied 
from the realm of morality. That Is, we can hardly praise or 
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blame a person for " having made a choice" if that person 
has had a choice in the same way that Skinner's hen has 
had an egg.' 
So far in this analy sis I have stretched the opposing 
poles of the individual/collective paradox, simpli fying 
each position and ignoring those developmen ts in 
phi losophy and the social sciences which have worked to 
mitigate the split. Unfortunately, such develo pments t d 
to fall outside the mainstream of the various foundational 
disciplines, so that it is usually Quite d ifficult for 
educators to get in touch with them. This seems to me to 
explain why those curriculum theorists called Recon· 
ceptualists often look outside mainstream soc ial science 
and sometimes to disciplines l ike l iterature and art for 
red irection; they deliberately seek out researchers 
working on the fringes or crossing discipl inary lines In or · 
der to reconceptualize problems that have resisted 
traditional solutions. Thus we might say that even though 
some phi losophers and social scientists have begun to 
address the individual/collective paradox and have un· 
covered some promising directions for resolution, the 
paradox is sti ll very much with us. And it proves to be 
especial ly debilit ating In moral education, which has at i ts 
center the problemat ic relationship between individual 
choice and determining soc ial circumstances. 
One philosopher and social theorist whose recent 
work may be helpful to moral educators is Jurgen Haber-
mas. For a variety of reasons, his work is not generally 
known in this country. although it is widely read in his own 
country of Germany and th roughou t Europe. 
Habermas' work is admittedly difficult, espe cially for 
those with a phi losophical background in the Anglo· 
American tradition of empiricism. Moreover, those works 
by Habermas that have been translated into English for 
the most part do not address educational questions di· 
rectly. His most widely known work, Knowledge and Hu· 
man Interests, is in fact a critique o f positivism. And the 
education·oriented essays of Toward a Rational Society 
focus on problems of the German educational system 
during the 1960's and thus resist quick application to 
educational problems in this country. 
But perhaps it is this very foreignness that makes 
Habermas· work significant to the problems o f ethical 
theory and moral education. For with his philosophical 
roots in Continental philosophy, especially in the works of 
Hegel and Marx, Habermas has been able to bring new 
light to the ind ividual/collective paradox that has defied so 
many Ang lo·American researchers. This is not to say that 
Habermas avoids or rejects philosophers and researchers 
in our tradition; he has, in fact, been influenced by 
philosophers as diverse as the American pragmatis t 
Charles Sanders Peirce and the British analyst John L. 
Austin. He is also conversant with social science research 
from Max Weber to Jane Loevinger and Lawrence 
Koh Iberg. 
Jn fact the one translated essay by Habermas that 
directly addresses the problem of educational foun· 
datlons is a critique and reconstruction of Kohlberg's 
theory of cognitive moral development.' That theory, 
which has gained some popularity among moral 
educators, posits six stages which form a hierarchy of 
qualitative·distinct ways of deciding moral questions and, 
thus, of guid ing moral action. On the basis of 20 years of 
Investigation, Koh lberg has found that a child passes 
through a number of discrete and invariant stages of moral 
development, moving from an ego.centric basis for de· 
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cision through a later adherence to social conventions 
to a more reflective or " po st·conventio nal" s tage. (See 
Chart 1) As we might expect from Kohl berg's labels, most 
people reach the th ird or fou rth stage of cognitive moral 
development and remain there for most o f their lives. Only 
a few, Socrates or Jesus or Martin Luther King, for exam· 
pie, seem to attain the broad universal principles of Stage 
Six. 
On the basis of this theory, Kohlberg has developed 
an approach to moral education that pushes students to 
higher levels of moral development, primarily through the 
use of ethical d ilemmas. Thus, a student at Stage Two is 
presented in c lassroom discussion with a i ictional ethical 
situation that demands a more comprehensive analysis 
than is available within Stage Two reasoning. For exam. 
pie, a student is asked to formulate a course of action for 
an impoverished husband who is tempted to steal the ex· 
pensive medicine his wife needs to survive. Such a fie· 
tional situation helps the studen t to realize that individual 
needs and desires may compete with or be over.ridden by 
agreed·upon conventions. Kohlberg carefu lly sets up the 
terms of each fictional dilemma so that the s tudent is 
forced to look beyond his stage of moral development in or-
der to arrive at a satisfactory resolution. The student may 
be forced to move from an egocentric Stage Two decision 
to a Stage Three fear of punishment or towards a Stage 
Four refusal to show disrespect for the laws against theft. 
Confronting these dilemmas and examining possible 
resolutions is supposed to foster the cognitive develop· 
ment of students in relation to these ethical questions. 
We shou Id note how Kohl berg defends this approach 
from the twin dangers of indoctrination and subjectivism. 
First, his approach concentrates on the form of the moral 
judgment rather than the content; it also demands a 
classroom atmosphere of d ialogue and mutual respect. 
This emphasis on form and interaction among students 
and teacher lessens the likelihood the teacher or the 
student's peers will impose their moral decisions on the 
individual s tudent and thereby deny him the opportunity 
21 
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to make his own moral choice . Secondly, Kohlberg co n· 
tends that the greater comprehensiveness of the latter 
stages of his hierarchy provides an objective progression 
In the structure If not in the content of ethical judgments 
and moral explanations. Thus the value neutrality or sub-
jectivity of the values clarification approach, for example, 
is replaced in Kohlberg's curriculum with a formal ob· 
jectivity. 
There is much more to Kohlberg's theory of moral 
development, and much of it is helpful and convincing. 
But one quickly notices the Kantian emphasis in 
Kohlberg's theory, especially as it focuses on lhe 
cognitive factors Involve d in moral decisions and ac tions. 
Kohlberg has indeed preserved individual choice through 
the various stages o f moral development, but seems to 
Ignore those factors that seem external and non·cognitive, 
factors that have been analyzed in great detail by the 
social sciences. 
Kohl berg's Justi fication tor proceeding in this manner 
Is that the cognitive aspects of mora l development are the 
most important factor we have so far discovered. He 
would admit that non.cognitive and utilitarian factors in· 
fluence moral decisio ns, but he holds little hope for con· 
necting inlernal and external factors, or individual and 
social perspectives, beyond the limited connections now 
made in Chart I. 
So, as valuable as Kohlberg's research and inter· 
prntations have been, we are still left with the unre-
solved dilemma of individual choice In a world that is un· 
avoidably social. We have not been able to approach the 
strict standard that Robert Paul Wolff sets forth in his 
analysis of Kantian ethics: 
... an adequate foundation for moral theory requires 
some coherent way of understanding men's actions 
both as causally determined, predictable, natural 
events and as rationally ini tiated, pol Icy-directed ac· 
lions. None o f the familiar dodges, relaxations of the 
conflict, or reinterpretations designed to dissolve 
the problem will do .... If any sense is to be made o f 
responsibil ity and acllon, then one and the same bit 
of behavior which can be explained physiologically, 
pred icted statistically, and brought within the scope 
of a scien tific theory must also be capable of being 
consistently unders1ood as Issuing from the 
autonomous aclion of practical reason.' 
But this is precisely the challenge that Habermas 
takes up in h is reconstruction of Kohlberg 's theory. He 
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adds to the developmental psychology emphasis of 
Kohlbilrg's work a sociological dimension, one that 
relates the six stages to the process of socialization. By 
thus drawing on the work of George Herbert Mead and 
Talcott Parsons, among others, Habermas moves 
Kohlberg's theory lrom a monologic basis to a dialogic 
basis. Another way to describe Habermas' direction is in 
terms of the social contract theory that underlies so much 
of our social and politica l thought. Habermas would pose 
two questions of the fami liar social contract theory that 
has its counterpart in Kohlberg's Fifth Stage: 1) How do 
moral agents entering into a social contract become 
responsible agen ts in the first place? and 2) How do the In-
terests o f Individuals combine to constitute universa l prln· 
ciples, tha  I how are ethical universals formed? 
From a historical perspective, both questions can be 
traced back to Hegel's critique of Kantian ethics. Both 
point to the weakness in Kohlberg's theory, and in for · 
m alistic ethics generally, namely, their static and In· 
dividualistlc foundation. But what is most important here 
is that Habermas calls our attention to the dynamic and 
social nature of moral development. He brings to 
Kohlberg's theory much-needed sociological insights Into 
how we become aware of ourselves as agents acting In the 
world, into how we come to see the interaction of in· 
tent ions and consequences in our actions, and of how we 
gradually recognize norms and the conditions for apply Ing 
those norms to our decisions and actions. 
Once again we must note that Habermas' recon· 
struction Is a detailed and complicated critique, as one 
can see from the various columns in Chart II. But his 
broadening of Kohlberg's base gives moral educalors a 
better theoretical foundation for their work in schools, one 
that moves beyond a static conception of already-formed 
individuals align ing themselves with already·es tablished 
moral principles or stages. As a result, a student's 
question about why he can't follow his private value 
position and cheat on the next test need no t create a crisis 
In the moral education curriculum. In fact, from Haber. 
mas' perspective, such a question would provide the op-
portunity to consider a number of important ethical 
Issues. Rather than avoid the issue, a teacher could ad· 
vance the discussion by asking the student to consider 
the nature of conventional classroom rules against 
cheating, the tension that usually exists between private 
Interest and social welfare, and the role that the teacher 
often fulfills In the classroom as enforcer of society's 
rules and regulations. 
Admitted ly, these topics may prove hazardous for the 
moral educator. In the first place, the teacher's own role Is 
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likely to come under the scru tiny o f his students. Sec· 
ondly, these topics are sure to provide the teacher with more 
puzzling moments than are likely to occur within the sup-
posedly neutral values clarification curriculum. The 
teacher might even find that simple questions, like those 
abOut cheating, lead finally to d iscussions concerned with 
things like the function of testing In the schools, a topic 
that seems complex no matter how advanced one's stage 
of cognitive development. 
Th is last example points, however, to an additional 
benefit of Habermas' approach. That is, Habermas is able 
to posit a Seventh Stage of moral development, one that 
moves beyond a Kantian base in universalized duty to a 
basis in moral and political freedom. This base is dialogic 
and social rather than monologlc and subjective. At th is 
stage, we have more than the formal goal of Stage Six to 
serve as an end point for our theory o f moral development. 
we can now consider the consequences as well as the 
form of our moral deliberations, we can take into account 
factors like human needs and welfare, and we can finally 
add a certain degree of content and specificity to ethical 
theory and moral education. 
To sum up, we might say that Habermas wants to con· 
sider social and external factors without reducing ethics 
to a utilitarian calculation; at the same time, he wants to 
preserve individual choice without adopting the ab· 
stractness of ethical formalism. His efforts certainly need 
greater development and application, but they do offer us 
a view of moral education that avoids the subjective and 
inconsequential flavor of so much o f what passes as 
moral education. In contras t, Habermas' reconstruction 
provides a basis for taking moral education serio usly. It 
not only offers us a compell ing explanation of the in· 
terac tive nature o f ethical un iversals and the interp lay be· 
tween individual autonomy and soc ial constraints, but it 
accounts for those conditions that surround moral 
education and ultim ately moral choice. 
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